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PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AS AN
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE: AN
ANALYSIS OF PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
In February 1964, Edwin Johnson was indicted by the Yolo
County Grand Jury for the crime of incest.' The twofold basis of
the indictment lay in the testimony of his 15-year-old daughter,
Elaine, who stated that he had engaged in an act of sexual
intercourse with her on January 11, 1964; and in the testimony of
his wife, Eleanor, who claimed that she had observed occasions of
sex play between her husband and daughter. At trial in January
1967, however, both witnesses denied that defendant had engaged
in any illicit sexual relations with Elaine. To negate these denials,
the prosecution, utilizing section 1235 of the California Evidence
Code,3 introduced as substantive evidence the prior statements of
Elaine and Mrs. Johnson before the grand jury. Although Elaine
Johnson's prior testimony constituted the only evidence of the
alleged criminal act, and Mrs. Johnson's prior statement the only
supporting evidence, the defendant was found guilty. The
California District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of California, held, reversed: The
admission of a witness' prior inconsistent statements for their
substantive value in criminal cases violates the defendant's sixth
amendment right of confrontation. People v. Johnson, 68 Adv. Cal.
674,441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968).
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (West 1955).
2. Defendant entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced. The United States District
Court set aside the conviction on the constitutional ground of inadequate representation by
counsel. Defendant was rearraigned on January 24, 1967.
3. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (fVest 1965).
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT. Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his
testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 770 (West 1965).
EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENT OF WITNESS. Unless the interests of
justice otherwise require, extrinsic evidence of a statement made by a witness
that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing shall be
excluded unless: (a) The witness was examined as to give him an opportunity to
explain or to deny the statement; or (b) The witness has not been excused from
giving further testimony in the action.
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I. Prior Inconsistent Statements and The Hearsay Rule:
Adequacy of Cross-Examination, Necessity, and Reliability
Hearsay is "evidence of a statement that was made other than
by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated."4 The reasons underlying the
exclusionary rule's requirement that the witness be present in court
are as follows: (1) The testimony is made under oath, which
encourages truthfulness; (2) the demeanor of the witness can be
observed by the jury, which aids in assessing his credibility; and (3)
the right to cross-examine opposing witnesses is protected.' While
the oath and demeanor aspects are important, they are not
essential;6 it is the right of cross-examination that is paramount.'
The purpose of cross-examination is to extract from the witness any
qualifying circumstances left undeveloped by the direct
examination and thereby examine the full scope of his perception,
memory, and motive for testifying In this way, the surrounding
circumstances of the testimony are presented to the jury in the
most complete form for the determination of the truth.
Although admissible for impeachment purposes, 9 prior
inconsistent statements have traditionally been excluded as
substantive evidence."0 Legal scholars have argued, however, that
the objections to hearsay evidence are inappropriate in this instance
and have advocated the admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements as an exception to the hearsay rule." Professor
4. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 1965); This California statutory definition is an
adoption of Professor McCormick's defnition. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 230
at 480 (1954) [Hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
5. See generally MCCORMICK § 224.
6. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1362 at 7 (3d ed. 1940) [Hereinafter cited as WIGMORE],
(where it is stated that the oath is not essential but is merely a normal incident to cross-
examination). But cf Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); In Aquino v. Virgin Islands,
378 F.2d 540 (3d Cir: 1967), the United States Court of Appeals considered the significance
of demeanor evidence and concluded that, although highly important, it is not essential.
7. 5 WIGMORE § 1397, at 130.
8. People v. Polack, 165 Cal. App. 2d 226, 331 P.2d 662 (1958); 5 WIGMORE § 1362, at
3.
9. 3 WIGMORE § 1018, at 687. Prior inconsistent statements offered for impeachment
are not hearsay.
10. 3 WIGMORE§ 1018, at687n.3.
I1. MCCORMICK § 39; 3 WIGMORE 4 1018; Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its
Exceptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 43, 49-55 (1954); McCormick, The Turncoat Witness:
Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 573 (1947); Morgan, The
Law of Evidence 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481, 545-50 (1946). Professor Morgan argues
that the traditional objections to hearsay are so completely satisfied that prior inconsistent
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Wigmore suggested that the purpose of the hearsay rule would be
satisfied since the declarant will be present in court and the
adversary will have ample opportunity through cross-examination
to require the witness to explain and clarify any discrepancies in his
conflicting 'statements. Furthermore, his presence permits the
adversary and the jury to observe his demeanor.'
2
Persuaded by this argument, 3 the California legislature in
1965 approved a statutory exception admitting prior inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence. In the first test of its
constitutionality, the California Supreme Court has held that
section 1235 infringes upon a criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to cross-examination. The Johnson court found
that the proponents of the exception had failed to recognize the
critical importance of immediate cross-examination. 4
The concept of immediacy of cross-examination has
traditionally referred to the trial procedure of permitting cross-
examination to follow the witness' direct testimony before he is
excused from the stand. This procedural safeguard serves two
distinct purposes: (1) It offers an adversary the opportunity to
impeach the credibility of a witness and to pinpoint any
inaccuracies or untruths in his statements on direct examination
before they become entrenched in the minds of the jury;" (2) it
avoids the possibility that a delay in cross-examination will allow
the witness to reconsider his testimony, will render him susceptible
to the influence of interested parties, or will strengthen his
adherence to a fallacious or erroneous version of the transaction or
event in question. 6 The Johnson court alluded to these criteria in
statements are not hearsay. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 196 (1948); see United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 817
(2d Cir. 1962).
12. 3 WIGMORE § 1018, at688.
13. 4 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMNI'N, REPORTS, RECOMIIENDATIONS AND
STUDIES, A Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 401, 425-39 (1963)
[Hereinafter cited as CAL. STUDY]; The same hearsay exception has been adopted in other
jurisdictions: KANSAS STAT. ANN., 60-460(a) (1964); VIRGIN ISLANDS CODE, Title 5
§ 931(1) (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN., RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 63(1) adopted by Supreme
Court effective Sept. !1, 1967. The only case found construing any of these codes or rules,
and finding it applicable is State v. Matlock, 49 N.J. 491, 231 A.2d 369 (1967), which
involved a prior identification. The California court has judicially adopted the exception for
this limited purpose. People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 345 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960).
14. 68 Adv. Cal. 674, 684, 441 P.2d I 11, 117, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, 605.
15. 5 WIGMORE § 1368, at 34.
16. This second purpose of immediacy is not discussed by the authorities. It is a natural
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concluding that defendant's cross-examination is inadequate
whenever it would not immediately follow the articulation of the
out of court declaration. However, if cross-examination promptly
follows the introduction of the prior statements at trial, the jury
should encounter no greater difficulty in perceiving falsehoods and
contradictions in the witness' extrajudicial utterence than in
detecting those inhering in his present testimony. Moreover, since
section 1235 requires that the hearsay declaration be inconsistent
with the witness' statements at trial, the judicial fear that a time
lapse will harden his allegiance to an earlier falsehood never
materializes. Since his statements at trial reflect a change of
opinion or a modification of his recollection of a particular
transaction, the possible effect of outside influence casts doubt on
the credibility of the witness' present testimony, not on the
truthfulness of his prior extrajudicial pronouncements.
A witness' present testimony and his prior inconsistent
statements uttered out of court are recitals of different
interpretations of the same sensory data. If cross-examination of
the witness is adequate when he voices his perceptions in court,
there is no reason to believe that cross-examination of another
version of the same perceptions will be less adequate merely because
the latter version was recorded at an earlier time. Furthermore, if
the witness adopts a prior inconsistent statement with which he is
confronted in court, his extrajudicial statement becomes admissible
as present testimony. 7 It is difficult to discern any difference in the
quality of cross-examination in this situation as compared to the
case where he adImits making the statement but refuses to affirm it
as true. 8 The witness is as capable of explaining his affirmation as
correlative, however, and it is implicit in the argument of the juducial authority relied on by
Johnson. Thus, Justice Stone argued in 1939:
False testimony is apt to harden and become unyielding to the blows of truth in
proportion as the witness has opportunity for reconsideration and influence by
suggestions of others, whose interest may be, and often is, to maintain falsehood
rather than truth.
State v. Saporen, 204 Minn. 358, 362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939).
17. MCCORMICK § 39, at 74.
18. In Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 113, 150 N.W.2d 146, 156 (1966), the court
found that the adversary nature of cross-examination is diluted if the witness refuses to
affirm the prior statement as true. The opponent of the prior statement must become the
witness' friend and the cross-examination becomes, in effect, a rehabilitation of the witness.
However, there is no apparent reason why the cross-examiner will be less successful in
overcoming the prior statement, when, by the nature of the situation, the witness will be
willing to help him. While the primary goal of a cross-examiner is to destroy the witness'
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his denial. The factual situation in People v. Johnson illustrates
that the cross-examiner is not necessarily less effective when he
attacks the prior inconsistent statements of a witness than when he
seeks to discredit present testimony. Both Elaine and Mrs. Johnson
testified that defendant had never engaged in sexual misconduct
with his daughter whereupon the prosecution introduced their prior
inconsistent statements. On cross-examination, they denied the
truthfulness of their prior statements to the grand jury. In addition,
defendant elicited from the witnesses a thorough explanation of
their reasons for having incriminated him before the grand jury. If
Elaine and Mrs. Johnson adopted and repeated at trial the
substance of their testimony to the grand jury, it is inconceivable
that defendant's cross-examination could have been more
satisfactory than it actually was. If the ultimate aim of the
adversary on cross-examination is to refute and completely
discredit damaging testimony, the adequacy of cross-examination
should be measured by the defendant's ability and opportunity to
bring out all the possible facts and circumstances tending toward
that end. In this respect, defendant Johnson was eminently
successful.
Since the witness admitted uttering the extrajudicial
statements, the Johnson holding that defendant's sixth amendment
right to cross-examine was violated seems inappropriate. 9 It
suggests, however, a judicial distrust of the breadth of section 1235.
Whenever a witness denies or does not remember uttering an
extrajudicial statement, he will be unable to clarify the
inconsistencies with his present testimony. Since his memory and
perception cannot be probed by the opponent, there is little chance
that cross-examination will be of any value as a testing procedure. 0
testimony, hostility seems to be a factor only because the adversary is the one most likely to
search out the facts which might subvert the statement.
19. It appears that a more persuasive argument for reversal-not discussed in the
Johnson opinion, nor presented by defendant Johnson on appeal-is that there was
insufficient evidence upon which the jury could reach a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Considering this problem the Ruhala court observed:
If the only evidence of an essential fact in a lawsuit were a statement made from
the witness stand which the witness himself completely recanted and repudiated
before he left the witness stand, no one would seriously urge that a jury question
had been made out.
Id. at 115, 150 N.W.2d at 158; cf People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 345 P.2d 865, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 273 (Prior extrajudicial identification admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule,
but if unconfirmed at trial it will not sustain a conviction).
20. In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1964), the United States Supreme
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In these instances, therefore, it would be justifiable to declare
section 1235 unconstitutional. Where the opponent lacks the
opportunity for adequate cross-examination of prior inconsistent
statements, their admissibility as substantive evidence must depend
solely upon the traditional bases of hearsay exceptions-necessity
and reliability.2 If the prosecution's only proof of an essential
element of the crime is the witness' inconsistent extrajudicial
statement, the question of necessity will not arise since there is
insufficient evidence to support a conviction."2 However, where the
prosecution has independent evidence and the introduction of a
prior inconsistent statement may reasonably affect the verdict, the
element of necessity would seem to be established.
With respect to the reliability of prior inconsistent statements,
a comparison between section 1235 and the hearsay exception "past
recollections recorded"23 is instructive. If a witness' memory is
insufficient to permit full and accurate testimony at trial, his extra-
judicial narration is admissible hearsay if: (1) the witness reduced it
to a writing when the facts were fresh in his mind and (2) he testifies
that it was an accurate statement of the event when it was
composed.24 This substantial evidentiary foundation is demanded
since cross-examination is ineffectual when the witness does not
remember the contents of the written statement.25 However, where
the witness denies or does not remember uttering an inconsistent
Court held that when the prosecution introduces a confession of a witness implicating the
criminal defendant and the witness invokes his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination, the defendant has been effectively denied his constitutional right to cross-
examine. The Douglas court observed that only if the witness had admitted making the
confession would the defendant have had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine him. The
practical effect of a witness' refusal to answer by pleading a constitutional privilege seems
indistinguishable from his denying or failing to remember the communication of a prior
inconsistent statement; see Falknor, supra note 11, at 53.
21. Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1954); MCCORMICK
§ 23 1, at 487.
22. See discussion in note 19, supra.
23. See generally 3 WIGMORE § 734; The accompanying discussion in the text is based
upon the exception for past recollection recorded as codified in CAL. EViD. CODE § 1237
(West 1965).
24. The hearsay declarant's testimony that the statement is true provides sufficient
assurance of trustworthiness. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1237, Comment (West 1965).
25. See MCCORMICK § 9, at 14-18 where the confusion of "refreshing recollection"
and "past recollection recorded" is discussed. Where the witness has refreshed his recollec-
tion after inspecting the written document, the adversary may effectively cross-examine. In
the latter case, however, where the witness testifies that he does not recall the transaction
and merely testifies to the accuracy and truthfulness of the writing, there must be other
assurances of reliability since cross-examination is ineffectual.
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extrajudicial declaration, section 1235 does not provide any
comparable safeguards of reliability. It merely requires that the
hearsay declaration be inconsistent with the present testimony of
the witness and that he be given an opportunity to explain or deny
it. Section 1235 does not discriminate between oral and written
statements, 26 nor does it protect against the admission of
statements recorded by overzealous law enforcement officers intent
on obtaining a conviction.2 The proponents of section 1235 argue
that prior inconsistent statements are more likely to be true than
present testimony since they were made closer in point of time to
the event in question and are less likely to be influenced by the
controversy."s When the witness admits having uttered the
inconsistent extrajudicial statement, the proponents' assurance of
reliability together with the defendant's opportunity for effective
cross-examination may be a sufficient basis for the admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements as an exception to the hearsay rule.
However, where cross-examination is impossible because the
witness denies or does not remember the out of court statement, this
claim of reliability by itself is not convincing.
The Johnson court's application of the procedural concept of
immediate cross-examination to the factual situation seems inapt.
The court ignored the possibility that a criminal defendant may
26. Professor McCormick argued that the proposed hearsay exception for prior
inconsistent statements should exclude oral statements not acknowledged by the witness
because of the danger of inaccuracy in transmission. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness:
Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 573, 588.
27. It seems that criminal investigations conducted by law enforcement officials are no
less vulnerable to the same occupational bias often attributed to insurance adjusters in civil
investigations. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-293 as amended 1964, c. 350. In actions for
personal injury or wrongful death, prior extrajudicial statements, affidavits, or voice
recordings with the exception of depositions cannot be used to impeach a witness. The statute
is designed to correct the practice of insurance adjusters who obtained statements at the scene
of an accident from persons who might not have fully recovered from shock and not in full
possession of their faculties. Harris v. Harrington, 180 Va. 210, 220, 22 S.E.2d 13, 17 (1942);
see DuParc, The Uniform Rules: A Plaintiffs View, 40 MINN. L. REV. 301, 338 (1956). (The
author's only objection to the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements is his
distrust of the reliability of statements obtained by insurance claim adjusters who might put
ideas in the witness' mind); cf Dow, KLM v. Tuller: A New Approach to Admissibility of
Prior Statements of a Witness, 41 NEB. L. REv. 598, 607 (1962), where the author warns that
judges should be alert to the fact that pressure to secure statements will be increased with a
view to making the best possible case before the jury.
28. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, at 577; CAL. STUDY at 429; With respect to the effect
of the time lapse on the witness' memory, this argument has been accepted by the California
court for the limited purpose of allowing proof of a prior extrajudicial identification of
criminal defendants. People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621,345 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273.
[Vol. 6
1969] COMMENTS
have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine despite the time
interval elapsing between the utterance of an inconsistent
extrajudicial declaration and the defendant's confrontation of the
witness at trial. While each of the traditional hearsay exceptions
possess unique assurances of reliability and trustworthiness, none
provide the defendant with the opportunity for effective cross-
examination at trial. However, it is this right which is the
cornerstone of the sixth amendment. Only when the witness recalls
the prior inconsistent statement, is this constitutional consideration
satisfied.
29
HI. The Evidentiary Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements for
Impeachment: The Future Viability of the Limiting Instruction
The Johnson holding limits the prosecution's use of prior
inconsistent statements to impeachment; it also restores the
applicability of a limiting instruction. Upon the defendant's request
the trial court must inform the jury that it may consider the
29. The constitutional basis of the Johnson opinion limits its result to exclusion of prior
inconsistent statements as hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant. The exception
remains available for use by the defendant and by opponents in civil actions. Whether
limitations upon the use of section 1235 in civil cases will follow may depend upon a case by
case analysis and the extent of the right to cross-examination. The sixth amendment
guarantees the right of cross-examination to criminal defendants. However, the federal
constitution does not explicitly grant the same right to civil litigants. The 14th amendment
guarantees that property will not be taken without "due process of law." If "[tihe test of
cross-examination is the highest and most indispensible known to the law for the discovery of
truth[,]" 58 Am. JUR. Witnesses § 610, at 339, it is fair to ask whether it is included in the
idea of "due process." The California court has said it is: "The law is clear that undue
infringement on the right of cross-examination . . . is a deprivation of the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law." Pence v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 48, 50-51,
403 P.2d 140, 142, 45 Cal. Rptr. 12, 14 (1964). Other civil cases have invoked the due process
concept in requiring cross-examination, or in finding that the party was deprived of the right.
Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Voris, 190 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1951); Long v. Long, 251
Cal. App. 2d 732, 736, 59 Cal. Rptr. 790, 794 (1967); Polk v. Polk, 228 Cal. App. 2d 763,
772, 39 Cal. Rptr. 824, 832 (1964); Payette v. Sterle, 202 Cal. App. 2d 372, 375, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 22, 25 (1962); McCarthy v. Mobile Cranes Inc., 199 Cal. App. 2d 500, 506, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 750, 756 (1962). However, none of these cases afforded the appellant any opportunity
at trial to cross-examine a witness. Although, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is
explicit in the sixth amendment and, as shown above, implicit in the fifth and 14th
amendments, whether "undue infringement" of that right is the same under both, i.e.,
whether the right to cross-examine in criminal and civil cases is co-extensive, has not been
defined.
Some indication may be seen by comparing Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), a
state criminal case, with DuBeau v. Smither & Mayton Co., 203 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1953), a
civil case tried in the federal district court. In Smith the defendant was not permitted to ask
an informant-witness his true name and address. The Supreme Court said that such
information was needed to place the witness in his environment in order to test his credibility.
SAN DIEGO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 6
extrajudicial statement only as evidence of the witness' credi-
bility, and not for the truth of the matter stated. 0
Judicial distrust of the jury's ability to ignore evidence for one
purpose while considering it for another has been expressed for
many years.' In the 1933 case of Shepard v. United States,2 the
defendant was accused of the murder of his wife by poison. The
theory of the defense was that she committed suicide. Shortly
before her death, she told a witness, "Dr. Shepard has poisoned
me." The Supreme Court of the United States held that the
decedent's statement was inadmissible as a dying declaration on the
ground that death was not imminent. The Government contended
that the extrajudicial statement was admissible to rebut evidence of
an intent to commit suicide. However, Justice Cardozo, delivering
the opinion of the Court, opined that a limiting instruction would
not insure that the jury would separate the import of decedent's
accusation from the purpose for which the evidence was offered:
Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond the compass of
Therefore, "[t]o forbid this most-rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to
emasculate the right of cross-examination itself." 390 U.S. at 131. In DuBeau, the
deposition of a witness was taken prior to trial. The witness gave his name, but on cross-
examination he refused to give his address or occupation. The appellate court held, on the
same grounds as in Smith, that it was error to admit the deposition in evidence. The DuBeau
court said, "Measuring the credibility of a witness in a civil trial is equally as important as in
a criminal trial." 203 F.2d at 396. These cases are limited to the issue of the credibility of the
witness. "Immediacy" is not analogous. There is, therefore, no analytic tool at hand to
suggest that the principle of the Johnson case should be applicable in civil cases. It seems,
however, that the infringement of the right to cross-examination in DuBeau and Smnith is not
as severe as in the case of the admission of an alleged out of court statement of a witness
who claims no memory, or denies its making. In those cases, at least, the right of cross-
examination as included in the constitutional guarantee of due process of law should be one
ground of attack against its admission as hearsay.
30. CAL. EVID. CODE § 355 (West 1965); e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, No.
54-A (1958).
31. See MCCORMICK § 39, at 77 nn.14-17; In some cases judges may be no more able
to avoid prejudice than juries. In the recent California case of People v. Charles, 66 Cal. 2d
330, 425 P.2d 545, 57 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1966), the California Supreme Court indicated that in
non-jury trials where the voluntariness of a defendant's confession is in issue, or where
portions of a codefendant's confession implicates another defendant in a joint trial, the
determination of voluntariness or whether deletions can be effected must be made by another
judge in pre-trial hearings and not by the judge presiding at trial. The court observed:
We have long recognized that judges are better able than juries to limit their
consideration of evidence to the purpose for which it is admissible. . . . Some
types of evidence are so difficult to disregard completely . . . or to consider for
one purpose but ignore for another . . . [that] [t]he hearing of evidence of this
kind, by judges as well as juries should be restricted to the essential minimum.
Id. at 338 n. 12, 425 P.2d at 550-51 n. 12, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 750-51 n. 12.
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ordinary minds. . . . It is for ordinary minds, and not for
psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence are framed. 2
During the October 1967 Term, the United States Supreme
Court reconsidered the viability of the limiting instruction in
another context and found it wanting. In Bruton v. United States34
the petitioner and a co-defendant were convicted in a joint trial. The
extrajudicial confession of the co-defendant-implicating the
petitioner-was admitted with a cautionary instruction to the jury
to disregard the confession as evidence against the non-confessing
defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, concurring with the
reasoning of Chief Justice Traynor in People v. A randa:3 5
A jury cannot segregate evidence into 'separate intellectual
boxes'. . . . It cannot determine that a confession is true
insofar as it admits that A committed criminal acts with B and
at the same time effectively ignore the inevitable conclusion that
B committed those same criminal acts with A. 6
32. 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
33. Id. at 104. People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 190, 148 P.2d 627, 633 (1944), the
statement of the murder victim that she intended to go out with "Frank" was admitted to
prove that she probably left her apartment on the night of the crime. The conviction of the
defendant, Frank Alcalde, was affirmed. In dissent, Justice Traynor quoted the Shepard
court, urging that a limiting instruction would not cure the prejudice.
34. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
35. 63 Cal. 2d 518,529,407 P.2d 265, 272,47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 360 (1965).
36. 391 U.S. at 131. The conclusion reached in these cases was seen by both courts as
the logical extention of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In that case the United
States Supreme Court held that it was error to submit the question of the voluntariness of
defendant's confession to the trial jury since the court doubted the jury's ability to separate
voluntariness from truth.
In Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242 (1957), overruled by Bruton, the
petitioner was one of five defendants in a joint trial. A codefendant's confession, made after
the termination of the conspiracy and therefore inadmissible against the petitioner, was
admitted against the codefendant. The trial court cautioned thejury several times to consider
it only against the confessing defendant. In affirming the petitioner's conviction, the court
stated:
Unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the court's instructions
where those instructions are clear and the circumstances are such that the jur'y
can reasonably be expected to follow them, the jury system makes little sense.
in United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959), the United States Court of
Appeals felt compelled to recognize the effectiveness of limiting instructions in view of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Delli Paoli. In Maloney questions were asked of two witnesses
which they refused to answer, relying on the fifth amendment. The jury might have assumed
certain facts not in evidence because the questions were asked, and infer that they were true
from the witnesses' refusal to answer. The "evidence," put before the jury in this way, gives
vital support to other evidence against the defendant. The Maloney court found that the
failure of the trial judge to give a cautionary instruction to the jury was error, even though
the defendant did not request it. Although the court required the instruction it questioned its
1969]
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Thus, the inability of the jury to make the required distinction was
tantamount to the admission of the co-defendant's confession
against the petitioner. Since the co-defendant did not testify at trial,
the petitioner was denied his sixth amendment right to cross-
examination.
In view of the judicial skepticism regarding the jury's capacity
to ignore evidence for one purpose while utilizing it for another,"
future courts must determine whether prior inconsistent statements
will be admissible even for impeachment. It is debatable whether a
jury is capable of comprehending the evidentiary distinction
between hearsay and impeachment.38 Aside from the problem of
understanding, it is questionable whether the limiting instruction,
in this instance, is effective. After a witness testifies to a particular
fact, the opposing party may introduce a prior statement
contradicting the present testimony. If the jury doubts the witness'
credibility and concludes that his present testimony is either false or
inaccurate, it may be a natural human inclination to conclude that
value: "[lit is doubtful whether such admonitions are not as likely to prejudice the interest of
the accused as help them." It imposes on the jury mental gymnastics which it is "absurd to
expect of them." However, the court said, if the "accredited ritual is ever to be taken
seriously" it should have been observed here. Id. at 538.
In Small v. Robbins, 258 F. Supp. 621 (D. Me. 1966), the confession of a witness,
implicating the petitioner, was presented in the form of leading questions, which the witness
refused to answer. Those questions, if believed by the jury to be the true facts, substantially
prejudiced the petitioner. The trial court gave a clear, easily understandable instruction (the
instruction is set out in State v. Small, - Me. _ 219 A.2d 263, 268, 272 (1966). On petition
for habeas corpus the federal court referred to the doubt of the effectiveness of limiting
instructions expressed by the Maloney court and found the instruction incapable of curing
the error. Relying on Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1964), the district court reversed,
finding that the petitioner was denied his right to cross-examine the witness against him.
Even though the evidence in Maloney had less potential for prejudice than that in Small,
the holding is questionable in view of the overruling of Delli Paoli.
37. But cf. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), where evidence of the prior
convictions of the petitioner were to be considered by the jury in determining the sentence-if
he was found guilty. The jury was directed to disregard the convictions for any other
purpose. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the convictions saying,
It would be extravagant in the extreme to take Jackson [v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368]
as evincing a general distrust on the part of this court of the ability ofjuries to
approach their task responsibly and to sort out discrete issues given to them
under proper instruction by the judge in a criminal cases, or as standing for the
proposition that limiting instructions can never purge the erroneous
introduction of evidence or limit evidence to its rightful purpose.
Id. at 565. The disputed evidence in Spencer is distinguishable from that in Bruton, Aranda,
and cases discussed in note 42, supra, in that it did not further the prosecution's case in an
affirmative way.
38. MCCORMICK § 39, at 77 nn.15-16.
CO MMENTS
the extrajudicial statement is a true representation of the disputed
fact.39 To be truly effective, the cautionary instruction must prevent
the jury from making this second determination. In analyzing the
mental processes of the trier of fact, Professor McCormick,
however, suggested that a determination of the truth of the out of
court statement is a prerequisite to a decision regarding the veracity
of the witness' assertion at trial." If this assessment is valid and if
the jury concludes that the extrajudicial statement is true, then the
effectiveness of the limiting instruction depends on the jury's ability
to erase a mental judgment it has already made. While the jury may
dutifully avoid mentioning the extrajudicial statement during
deliberations, it might, nevertheless, be influenced in its evaluation
of other evidence which the prior inconsistent statement tends to
corroborate, or, conversely, the jury might consider the substantive
evidentiary value of the impeaching statement when it is supported
by other evidence. In view of the Bruton opinion and the conclusion
of a study which demonstrated that the limiting instruction serves
only to entrench inadmissible evidence in the minds of the jury,4' the
efficacy of the limiting instruction accompanying the introduction
of prior inconsistent statements is suspect. If the limiting
instruction is adjudged ineffective, the admission of the impeaching
statement would amount to the introduction of otherwise
inadmissible hearsay. Thus, according to the Johnson holding, the
criminal defendant would be deprived of his sixth amendment right
to immediate cross-examination.
39. Id., at § 39 n. 14; Professor Wigmore observed:
The opinions are full of directions to trial Courts to tell the jurors to use their
mental force to ignore in such self-contradicting assertions that testimonial
value which their natural reason persists in seeing there.
3 VIGNIORE § 1018, at690.
40. MCCORMICK § 39, at 77-78.
41. Broeder, The Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 753-54 (1959). The results
of the deliberations of thirty juries, in controlled experimental civil damages cases, are
compared as to the'mention of insurance: Overall average verdict, $33,000; mention of
insurance but no objection, average verdict, $37,000; mention of insurance with objection
and cautionary instruction, average verdict, $46,000. In this last instance, unlike the others,
the jury did not discuss insurance during deliberations.
42. In a footnote to Aranda, Chief Justice Traynor interpreted Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1964)-which first applied the sixth amendment confrontation clause to the
states-in these terms:
It is not clear what other procedural practices Pointer precludes. It at least casts
further doubt, however, on any encroachment on the right of confrontation by
an instruction to disregard inadmissible hearsay evidence.
63 Cal. 2d at 530 n.8,407 P.2d at 272 n.8, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 360 n.8.
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SAN DIEGO LA W REVIEW
The dilemma posed by prior inconsistent statements is
distinguishable in two important respects from the problem that
confronted the Bruton and Aranda courts. The danger of
substantial prejudice to a defendant by the admission of a co-
defendant's extrajudicial confession implicating him is always
present. In contrast, prior inconsistent statements may vary from
mere negation of a witness' present testimony to a revelation
materially advancing the prosecution's case. Moreover, in A randa
and Bruton "viable alternatives"43 did exist: Co-defendants could
have been tried separately or the incriminating portions of the co-
defendant's confession deleted." There does not appear to be any
"viable alternative" by which the cross-examiner may demonstrate
the witness' inconsistency without revealing the content of the
prior extrajudicial statement-the choice is between admission and
exclusion.
Assuming a judicial reluctance to preclude the use of a
traditionally effective tool of the cross-examiner, it is unlikely that
the courts will, as a matter of law, hold extrajudicial statements
inadmissible for impeachment. Nevertheless, the deprivation of
defendant's right to immediate cross-examination cannot be
ignored. Thus, when a prior inconsistent statement is offered for the
limited purpose of impeachment, the "trial court of the future may
be required to determine in its discretion the question of
admissibility or exclusion in each case by weighing two
considerations: (1) the likelihood that a limiting instruction will be
effective, and (2) if ineffective, the possible prejudice to the
defendant. 45 When the impeaching statement merely negates the
testimony of the witness, the instruction may in fact be heeded by
the jury, and if it is not, any prejudice would appear to be slight. On
the other hand, whenever the impeaching evidence would
affirmatively advance the prosecution's argument on a material
issue, the probable effectiveness of the limiting instruction is
lessened, and the trial judge may be compelled to exclude the
43. 391 U.S. at 134, "Where viable alternatives do exist, it is deceptive to rely on the
pursuit of truth to defend a clearly harmful practice."
44. 63 Cal. 2d at 530-31, 407 P.2d at 272-73, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
45. This is substantially the same as the "critical weight" test set out in Namet v.
United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963). In that case a witness refused to answer some questions
claiming his privilege against self-incrimination. The test approved by the Court is:
[Whether] inferences taken from a witness' refusal to answer [added] critical




statement unless there is no reasonable possibility that the
infringement upon the defendant's sixth amendment right to cross-
examination would contribute to a conviction." This is the
potential legal quagmire arising from Johnson's requirement of
immediate cross-examination and the possible application of the
Bruton-A randa rationale to prior extrajudicial statements admitted
for impeachment.
KENNETH GLEASON
46. If the limiting instruction is not heeded the error is of federal constitutional
dimensions. The prosecution must show lack of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
